• "Desire" by Helen Hoyt
  • A Ride for Liberty—The Fugitive Slaves
  • Introduction
  • Chapter 1: Humanistic Thinking
  • Chapter 2: Growth, Obstacles, and Grit
  • Chapter 3: Individual, Collective, and Identity
  • Chapter 4: Time, Memory, and Impermanence
  • Ontological Exploration on Virtue 1
  • Chapter 5: Life, Death, and Loss
  • Chapter 6: Faith, Knowledge, and Inquiry
  • Chapter 7: Freedom, Law, and Responsibility
  • Ontological Exploration on Virtue 2
  • Chapter 8: Truth, Error, and Perception
  • Chapter 9: Strength, Humility, and Meekness
  • Chapter 10: Talent, Skill, and Creativity
  • Epilogue
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  • Translations
  • Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems by Galileo Galilei



    Born in the Northern Italian duchy of Florence in the city of Pisa, Galileo Galilei was an important figure in the development of observational astronomy as well as a handful of other scientific disciplines. Despite his interest in the newly developing scientific methodologies that often contradicted Church authority, Galileo considered himself faithful to the Church, having considered a career in the priesthood before enrolling in the University of Pisa to study medicine. Throughout his career, Galileo found himself at the center of controversies over various principles of astronomy or physics. In this treatise he supports the Copernican view of heliocentrism (the theory that the sun is the center of the solar system) using various repeatable and consistent observational experiments. At the time of its publication, much of the Western world embraced an Aristotelian geocentric view (that the Earth was the center of the solar system). Whereas his nearly irrifutable evidence supporting the heliocentric model was sufficient to invite accusations of heresy from some members of the Church, his clear doltish characterization of the adherents of the geocentric model (which were certainly in reference to the Pope) made his offenses unforgiveable. 

    The work is written as a dialogue that takes place over the course of four days.





    SALV. I see we are once more going to engulf ourselves in a boundless sea from which there is no getting out, ever. This is navigating without compass, stars, oars, or rudder, in which we must needs either pass from bank to bank or run aground, or sail forever lost. If, as you suggested, we are to get on with our main subject, it is necessary for the present to put aside the general question whether straight motion is necessary in nature and is proper to some bodies, and proceed to demonstrations, observations, and particular experiments. First we must propound all those that have been put forward to prove the earth's stability by Aristotle, Ptolemy, and others, trying next to resolve them. Finally we must produce those by which a person may become persuaded that the earth, no less than the moon or any other planet, is to be numbered among the natural bodies that move circularly.

    SAGR. I submit to the latter more willingly, as I am better satisfied with your architectonic and general discourse than with that of Aristotle. For yours satisfies me without the least misgiving, while the other blocks me in some way at every turn. Nor do I know why Simplicio should not be quickly satisfied with the argument you put forward to prove that motion in a straight line can have no place in nature, so long as we suppose the parts of the universe to be disposed in the best arrangement and perfectly ordered.

    SALV. Stop there, Sagredo. for now a way occurs to me in which Simplicio may be given satisfaction, provided only that he does not wish to stay so closely tied to every phrase of Aristotle's as to hold it sacrilege to depart from a single one of them.

    There is no doubt that to maintain the optimum placement and perfect order of the parts of the universe as to local situation, nothing will do but circular motion or rest. As to motion by a straight line, I do not see how it can be of use for anything except to restore to their natural location such integral bodies as have been accidentally removed and separated from their whole, as we have just said.

    Let us now consider the whole terrestrial globe, and let us see what can happen to make it and the other world bodies keep themselves in the natural and best disposition. One must either say that it is at rest and remains perpetually immovable in its place, or else that it stays always in its place but revolves itself, or finally that it goes about a center, moving along the circumference of a circle. Of these events, Aristotle and Ptolemy and all their followers say that it is the first which has always been observed and which will be forever maintained; that is, perpetual rest in the same place. Now why, then, should they not have said from the start that its natural property is to remain motionless, rather than making its natural motion downward, a motion with which it never did and never will move? And as to motion by a straight line, let it be granted to us that nature makes use of this to restore particles of earth, water, air, fire, and every other integral mundane body to their whole, when any of them find themselves separated and transported into some improper place unless this restoration can also be made by finding some more appropriate circular motion. It seems to me that this original position fits all the consequences much better, even by Aristotle's own method, than to attribute straight motion as an intrinsic and natural principle of the elements. This is obvious; for let me ask the Peripatetic if, being of the opinion that celestial bodies are incorruptible and eternal, he believes that the terrestrial globe is not so, but corruptible and mortal, so that there will come a time when, the sun and moon and other stars continuing their existence and their operations, the earth will not be found in the universe but will be annihilated along with the rest of the elements, and I am certain that he would answer, No. Therefore generation and corruption belong to the parts and not to the whole; indeed, to very small and superficial parts which are insensible in comparison to the whole mass. Now since Aristotle argues generation and corruption from the contrariety of straight motions, let us grant such motions to the parts, which alone change and decay. But to the whole globe and sphere of the elements will be ascribed either circular motion or perpetual continuance in its proper place -- the only tendencies fined for the perpetuation and maintenance of perfect order.

    What is thus said of earth may be said as reasonably of fire and of the greater part of the air, to which elements the Peripatetics are forced to assign as an intrinsic and natural motion one with which they were never moved and never will be, and to abolish from nature that motion with which they move, have moved, and are to be moved perpetually. I say this because they assign an upward motion to air and fire, which is a motion that never belongs to the said elements, but only to some of their particles -- and even then only to restore them to perfect arrangement when they are out of their natural places. On the other hand, they call circular motion (with which they are incessantly moved) preternatural to them, forgetting what Aristotle has said many times, that nothing violent can last very long.

    SIMP. To all these things we have the most suitable answers, which I omit for the present in order that we may come to the particular reasons and sensible experiments which ought to be finally preferred, as Aristotle well says, above anything that can be supplied by human argument.

    SAGR. Then what has been said up to now will serve to place under consideration which of two general arguments has the more probability. First there is that of Aristotle, who would persuade us that sublunar bodies are by nature generable and corruptible, etc., and are therefore very different in essence from celestial bodies, these being invariant, ingenerable, incorruptible, etc. This argument is deduced from differences of simple motions. Second is that of Salviati, who assumes the integral parts of the world to be disposed in the best order, and as a necessary consequence excludes straight motions for simple natural bodies as being of no use in nature; he takes the earth to be another of the celestial bodies, endowed with all the prerogatives that belong to them. The latter reasoning suits me better up to this point than the other. Therefore let Simplicio be good enough to produce all the specific arguments, experiments, and observations, both physical and astronomical, by which one may be fully persuaded that the earth differs from the celestial bodies, is immovable, and is located in the center of the universe, or anything else that would exclude the earth from being movable like a planet such as Jupiter, or the moon, etc. And you, Salviati, have the kindness to reply step by step.

    SIMP. For a beginning, then, here are two powerful demonstrations proving the earth to be very different from celestial bodies. First, bodies that are generable corruptible, alterable, etc., are quite different from those that are ingenerable, incorruptible, inalterable, etc. The earth is generable, corruptible, alterable, etc., while celestial bodies are ingenerable, incorruptible, inalterable, etc. Therefore the earth is very different from the celestial bodies.

    SAGR. With your first argument, you bring back to the table what has been standing there all day and has just now been carried away.

    SIMIP. Softly, sir; hear the rest, and you will see how different it is from that. Formerly the minor premise was proved a priori , and now I wish to prove it a posteriori . See for yourself whether this is the same thing. I shall prove the minor, because the major is obvious.

    Sensible experience shows that on earth there are continual generations, corruptions, alter-ations, etc., the like of which neither our senses nor the traditions or memories of our ancestors have ever detected in heaven; hence heaven is inalterable, etc., and the earth alterable, etc., and therefore different from the heavens.

    The second argument I take from a principal and essential property, which is this: whatever body is naturally dark and devoid of light is different from luminous and resplendent bodies; the earth is dark and without light, and celestial bodies are splendid and full of light; therefore, etc. Answer these, so that too great a pile does not accumulate, and then I will add others.

    SALV. As to the first, for whose force you appeal to experience, I wish you would tell me precisely what these alterations are that you see on the earth and not in the heavens, and on account of which you call the earth alterable and the heavens not.

    SIMP. On earth I continually see herbs, plants, animals generating and decaying; winds, rains, tempests, storms arising; in a word, the appearance of the earth undergoing perpetual change. None of these changes are to be discerned in celestial bodies, whose positions and configurations correspond exactly with everything men remember, without the generation of anything new there or the corruption of anything old.

    SALV. But if you have to content yourself with these visible, or rather these seen experiences, you must consider China and America celestial bodies, since you surely have never seen in them these alterations which you see in Italy. Therefore, in your sense, they must be inalterable.

    SIMP. Even if I have never seen such alterations in those places with my own senses, there are reliable accounts of them; besides which, cum eadem sit ratio totius et partium , those counties being a pan of the earth like ours, they must be alterable like this.

    SALV. But why have you not observed this, instead of reducing yourself to having to believe the tales of others? Why not see it with your own eyes?

    SIMP. Because those countries are far from being exposed to view; they are so distant that our sight could not discover such alterations in them.

    SALV. Now see for yourself how you have inadvertently revealed the fallacy of your argument. You say that alterations which may be seen near at hand on earth cannot be seen in America because of the great distance. Well, so much the less could they be seen in the moon, which is many hundreds of times more distant. And if you believe in alterations in Mexico on the basis of news from there, what reports do you have from the moon to convince you that there are no alterations there? From your not seeing alterations in heaven (where if any occurred you would not be able to see them by reason of the distance, and from whence no news is to be had), you cannot deduce that there are none, in the same way as from seeing and recognizing them on earth you correctly deduce that they do exist here.

    SIMP. Among the changes that have taken place on earth I can find some so great that if they had occurred on the moon they could yen well have been observed here below. From the oldest records we have it that formerly, at the Straits of Gibraltar, Abila and Calpe were joined together with some lesser mountains which held the ocean in check; but these mountains being separated by some cause, the opening admitted the sea, which flooded in so as to form the Mediterranean. When we consider the immensity of this, and the difference in appearance which must have been made in the water and land seen from afar, there is no doubt that such a change could easily have been seen by anyone then on the moon. Just so would the inhabitants of earth have discovered any such alteration in the moon; yet there is no history of such a thing being seen. Hence there remains no basis for saying that anything in the heavenly bodies is alterable, etc.

    SALV. I do not make bold to say that such great changes have taken place in the moon, but neither am I sure that they could not have happened. Such a mutation could be represented to us only by some variation between the lighter and the darker parts of the moon, and I doubt whether we have had observant selenographers on earth who have for any considerable number of years provided us with such exact selenography as would make us reasonably conclude that no such change has come about in the face of the moon. Of the moon's appearance, I find no more exact description than that some say it represents a human face; others, that it is like the muzzle of a lion; still others, that it is Cain with a bundle of thorns on his back. So to say "Heaven is inalterable, because neither in the moon nor in other celestial bodies are such alterations seen as are discovered upon the earth" has no power to prove anything.

    SAGR. This first argument of Simplicio's leaves me with another haunting doubt which I should like to have removed. Accordingly I ask him whether the earth was generable and corruptible before the Mediterranean inundation, or whether it began to be so then?

    SIMP. It was without doubt generable and corruptible before, as well; but that was so vast a mutation that it might have been observed as far as the moon.

    SAGR. Well, now; if the earth was generable and corruptible before that flood, why may not the moon be equally so without any such change? Why is something necessary in the moon which means nothing on the earth?

    SALV. A very penetrating remark. But I am afraid that Simplicio is altering the meaning a bit in this text of Aristotle and the other Peripatetics. They say that they hold the heavens to be inalterable because not one star there has ever been seen to be generated or corrupted, such being probably a lesser part of heaven than a city is of the earth; yet innumerable of the latter have been destroyed so that not a trace of them remains.

    SAGR. Really, I thought otherwise, believing that Simplicio distorted this exposition of the text so that he might not burden the Master and his disciples with a notion even more fantastic than the other. What folly it is to say, "The heavens are inalterable because stars are not generated or corrupted in them." Is there perhaps someone who has seen one terrestrial globe decay and another regenerated in its place? Is it not accepted by all philosophers that very few stars in the heavens are smaller than the earth, while a great many are much bigger? So the decay of a star in heaven would be no less momentous than for the whole terrestrial globe to be destroyed! Now if, in order to be able to introduce generation and corruption into the universe with certainty, it is necessary that as vast a body as a star must be corrupted and regenerated, then you had better give up the whole matter; for I assure you that you will never see the terrestrial globe or any other integral body in the universe so corrupted that, after having been seen for many ages past, it dissolves without leaving a trace behind.

    SALV. But to give Simplicio more than satisfaction, and to reclaim him if possible from his error, I declare that we do have in our age new events and observations such that if Aristotle were now alive, I have no doubt he would change his opinion. This is easily inferred from his own manner of philosophizing, for when he writes of considering the heavens inalterable, etc., because no new thing is seen to be generated there or any old one dissolved, he seems implicitly to let us understand that if he had seen any such event he would have reversed his opinion, and properly preferred the sensible experience to natural reason. Unless he had taken the senses into account, he would not have argued immutability from sensible mutations not being seen.

    SIMP. Aristotle first laid the basis of his argument a priori , showing the necessity of the inalterability of heaven by means of natural, evident, and clear principles. He afterward supported the same a posteriori , by the senses and by the traditions of the ancients.




    SALV. Then let the beginning of our reflections be the consideration that whatever motion comes to be attributed to the earth must necessarily remain imperceptible to us and as if nonexistent, so long as we look only at terrestrial objects; for as inhabitants of the earth, we consequently participate in the same motion. But on the other hand it is indeed just as necessary that it display itself very generally in all other visible bodies and objects which, being separated from the earth, do not take part in this movement. So the true method of investigating whether any motion can be attributed to the earth, and if so what it may be, is to observe and consider whether bodies separated from the earth exhibit some appearance of motion which belongs equally to all. For a motion which is perceived only, for example, in the moon, and which does not affect Venus or Jupiter or the other stars, cannot in any way be the earth's or anything but the moon's.

    Now there is one motion which is most general and supreme over all, and it is that by which the sun, moon, and all other planets and fixed stars--in a word, the whole universe, the earth alone excepted--appear to be moved as a unit from east to west in the space of twenty-four hours. This, in so far as first appearances are concerned, may just as logically belong to the earth alone as to the rest of the universe, since the same appearances would prevail as much in the one situation as in the other. Thus it is that Aristotle and Ptolemy, who thoroughly understood this consideration, in their attempt to prove the earth immovable do not argue against any other motion than this diurnal one, though Aristotle does drop a hint against another motion ascribed to it by an ancient writer of which we shall speak in the proper place.

    SAGR. I am quite convinced of the force of your argument, but it raises a question for me from which I do not know how to free myself, and it is this: Copernicus attributed to the earth another motion than the diurnal. By the rule just affirmed, this ought to remain imperceptible to all observations on the earth, but be visible in the rest of the universe. It seems to me that one may deduce as a necessary consequence either that he was grossly mistaken in assigning to the earth a motion corresponding to no appearance in the heavens generally, or that if the correspondent motion does exist, then Ptolemy was equally at fault in not explaining it away, as he explained away the other.

    SALV. This is very reasonably questioned, and when we come to treat of the other movement you Will see how greatly Copernicus surpassed Ptolemy in acuteness and penetration of mind by seeing what the latter did not-I mean the wonderful correspondence with which such a movement is reflected in all the other heavenly bodies. But let us postpone this for the present and return to the first consideration, With respect to which I shall set forth, commencing with the most general things, those reasons which seem to favor the earth's motion, so that we may then hear their refutation from Simplicio.

    First, let us consider only the immense bulk of the starry sphere in contrast With the smallness of the terrestrial globe, which is contained in the former so many millions of times. Now if we think of the velocity of motion required to make a complete rotation in a single day and night, I cannot persuade myself that anyone could be found who would think it the more reasonable and credible thing that it was the celestial sphere which did the turning, and the terrestrial globe which remained fixed.

    SAGR. If, throughout the whole variety of effects that could exist in nature as dependent upon these motions, all the same consequences followed indifferently to a hairsbreadth from both positions, still my first general impression of them would be this: I should think that anyone who considered it more reasonable for the whole universe to move in order to let the earth remain Fixed would be more irrational than one who should climb to the top of your cupola just to get a view of the city and its environs, and then demand that the whole countryside should revolve around him so that he would not have to take the trouble to turn his head. Doubtless there are many and great advantages to be drawn from the new theory and not from the previous one (which to my mind is comparable with or even surpasses the above in absurdity), making the former more credible than the latter. But perhaps Aristotle, Ptolemy, and Simplicio ought to marshal their advantages against us and set them forth, too, if such there are; otherwise it will be clear to me that there are none and cannot be any.

    SALV. Despite much thinking about it, I have not been able to find any difference, so it seems to me I have found that there can be no difference; hence I think it vain to seek one further. For consider: Motion, in so far as It is and acts as motion, to that extent exists relatively to things that lack it; and among things which all share equally in any motion, it does not act, and is as if It did not exist. Thus the goods with which a ship is laden leaving Venice, pass by Corfu, by Crete, by Cyprus and go to Aleppo. Venice, Corfu, Crete, etc. stand still and do not move with the ship; but as to the sacks, boxes, and bundles with which the boat is laden and with respect to the ship itself, the motion from Verflice to Syria is as nothing, and in no way alters their relation among themselves. This is so because it is common to all of them and all share equally in it. If, from the cargo in the ship, a sack were shifted from a chest one single inch, this alone would be more of a movement for it than the two-thousand-mile journey made by all of them together.

    SIMP. This is good, sound doctrine, and entirely Peripatetic.

    SALV. I should have thought it somewhat older. And I question whether Aristotle entirely understood it when selecting it from some good school of thought, and whether he has not, by altering it in his Writings, made it a source of confusion among those who wish to maintain everything he said. When he wrote that everything which is moved is moved upon something immovable, I think he only made equivocal the saying that whatever moves, moves with respect to something motionless. This proposition suffers no difficulties at all, whereas the other has many.

    SAGR. Please do not break the thread, but continue with the argument already begun.

    SALV. It is obvious, then, that motion which is common to many moving things is idle and inconsequential to the relation of these movables among themselves, nothing being changed among them, and that it is operative only in the relation that they have with other bodies lacking that motion, among which their location is changed. Now, having divided the universe into two parts, one of which is necessarily movable and the other motionless, it is the same thing to make the earth alone move, and to move all the rest of the universe, so far as concerns any result which may depend upon such movement. For the action of such a movement is only in the relation between the celestial bodies and the earth, which relation alone is changed. Now if precisely the same effect follows whether the earth is made to move and the rest of the universe stay still, or the earth alone remains fixed while the whole universe shares one motion, who is going to believe that nature (which by general agreement does not act by means of many things when it can do so by means of few) has chosen to make an immense number of extremely large bodies move with inconceivable velocities, to achieve what could have been done by a moderate movement of one single body around its own center?

    SIMP. I do not quite understand how this very great motion is as nothing for the sun, the moon, the other planets, and the innumerable host of the fixed stars. Why do you say it is nothing for the sun to pass from one meridian to the other, rise above this horizon and sink beneath that, causing now the day and now the night; and for the moon, the other planets, and the fixed stars to vary similarly?

    SALV. Every one of these variations which you recite to me is nothing except in relation to the earth. To see that this is true, remove the earth; nothing remains in the universe of rising and setting of the sun and moon, nor of horizons and meridians, nor day and night and in a word from this movement there will never originate any changes in the moon or sun or any stars you please, fixed or moving. All these changes are in relation to the earth, all of them meaning nothing except that the sun shows itself now over China, then to Persia, afterward to Egypt, to Greece, to France, to Spain, to America, etc. And the same holds for the moon and the rest of the heavenly bodies, this effect taking place in exactly the same way if, without embroiling the biggest part of the universe, the terrestrial globe is made to revolve upon itself

    And let us redouble the difficulty with another very great one, which is this. If this great motion is attributed to the heavens, it has to be made in the opposite direction from the specific motion of all the planetary orbs, of which each one incontrovertibly has its own motion from west to east, this being very gentle and moderate, and must then be made to rush the other way; that is, from east to west, with this very rapid diurnal motion. Whereas by making the earth itself move, the contrariety of motions is removed, and the single motion from west to east accommodates all the observations and satisfies them all completely.

    SIMP. As to the contrariety of motions, that would matter little, since Aristotle demonstrates that circular motions are not contrary to one another, and their opposition cannot be called true contrariety.

    SALV. Does Aristotle demonstrate that, or does he just say it because it suits certain designs of his? If, as he himself declares, contraries are those things which mutually destroy each other, I cannot see how two movable bodies meeting each other along a circular line conflict any less than if they had met along a straight line.


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